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THE TAX EXEMPTION OF DONOR-CONTROLLED
FOUNDATIONS
KENNETH L. KARST*
Although this article explores several proposals for tax reform
-specifically, proposals for change in the exempt status of founda-
tions under the control of their donors and the donors' families-
it is not intended as an exercise in fantasy. It is perfectly true that
tax reform in general has again suffered its traditional demotion
on the list of priorities for the Congress.' Reforms touching certain
foundations' exemption, however, are favored by some circum-
stances which are not common to most suggestions for tax reform.
First, the larger foundations have been the targets for four major
congressional investigations in the post-war period.2 While only
one of the investigations has resulted in reform legislation, their
frequency suggests that publicity-generating attacks on the founda-
tions are popular in Congress. The most serious abuses of the
present law of tax exemption are surely to be found among the
smaller foundations, which are incapable of producing billion-
dollar headlines; it may, however, be possible for serious reformers
to ride on a wave of publicity about the fictitious wrongdoing
charged to the giant foundations. This is not a call for bigger and
better investigations; it is simply a recognition that the great
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University. I am indebted
to Michael T. McGreevy, Esquire, of the Illinois bar, formerly of the Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel, The Treasury Department, for a number of the substantive ideas
and references in this article. The positions taken in the article, however, are neither
Mr. McGreevy's nor the Treasury Department's, but my own.
1 See Stern, "The Slow, Quiet Murder of Tax Reform," 227 Harper's No.
1363, p. 63 (1963) ; "Dillon Retreats on Tax Reforms," N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1963,
p. 1, col. 8; Shanahan, "Tax Reform, Anyone?", N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1964, p. 19,
col. 7.
2 (1) Reported in S. Rep. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), at least partly
responsible for the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 906; (2) Hearings
Before the Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable
Organizations of the House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reported
in H.R. Rep. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953) (Cox Committee); (3) Hearings
Before the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Com-
parable Organizations of the House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
reported in H.R. Rep. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (Reece Committee);
(4) Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy
(Chairman's Report to Select Committee on Small Business, H.R.), 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., (first installment, 1962; second installment, 1963) (Patman Report); see
Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, "Comment on the Patman Report," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
190 (1963).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
foundations have reached the point where they must expect periodic
congressional attack, and that it is an ill wind that blows nobody
good.3 Another circumstance which may differentiate the reform
proposals under discussion from the general run of tax reforms is
the existence of a potential (although still non-vocal) interest
group in support of reform: the competitors of businesses which
are the corporate half-sisters of family foundations. If those argu-
ments are unpersuasive, it can always be pleaded that would-be
reformers are not supposed to despair.
I. THE FAMILY FOUNDATION: WHosE BENEVOLENCE?
The typical family foundation 4 does not operate a charitable
enterprise such as an orphanage or a medical research program.
It is above all a bank account, a repository of capital. Its donor-
creator is its chief officer; since the foundation's form is normally
corporate, he is the president, and perhaps he is the treasurer as
well. His wife is vice-president and secretary. The other director
is the donor's attorney. There are no shareholders to supervise
the conduct of the foundation's affairs, nor are there any clearly-
defined beneficiaries who might be interested in the management.
The foundation regularly distributes its income in the form of gifts
to established charities, in order to avoid running afoul of the
anti-accumulations provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.5 It
does not distribute its corpus. As a functioning charitable endeavor,
it can hardly be said to exist.
Yet family foundations are enormously popular. In the latest
issue of The Foundation Directory the "whole group of 3,520
'family and miscellaneous' foundations are estimated to possess
only $2.3 billion in assets .. . ." Even that estimate is probably
conservative. The Treasury informed Congressman Patman that
in 1960 over 45,000 returns on Form 990-A were filed by organiza-
3 Perhaps because of interest aroused by Congressman Patman, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee recently "decided unanimously to ask the Treasury to make a study
of possible tax abuses in connection with private foundations and to report back this
year if possible." "Senators Review Action on Taxes," N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1964, p.
27, col. 5. A similar legislative event took place more than a decade ago in Rhode
Island, where the investigation of the Textron charities seemingly led to the enact-
ment of a general reporting law, not directly connected with the abuses reported in
the investigation. See Karst, "The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 482 n.192 (1960).
4 The term is used interchangeably with "donor-controlled foundation," although
there are many such foundations controlled by individuals whose families have no
connection with their foundations.
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 504(a) (1).
6 Andrews, Introduction to The Foundation Directory (2) at 9, 33 (Walton and
Lewis ed. 1964). (Emphasis added.) The first edition of the Directory noted some
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tions exempt under section 501(c) (3) of the Code.7 About one-
quarter of all current applications for exemption under that section
are estimated by officials of the Internal Revenue Service to come
from foundations. 8 The question of how many of these foundations
are "family" foundations raises definitional problems. Suffice it to
say that the Directory's estimate does not include all donor-
controlled foundations in its "family and miscellaneous" group.
The rapid increase in the number of family foundations co-
incides with the period during which high personal income tax
rates have been established and maintained. But the family founda-
tion is only an indirect creature of the tax laws. The well-
advertised tax advantages of charitable giving may be obtained
just as effectively when the donor gives to operating charities such
as the Red Cross or the Heart Fund. The motivation for creating
one's own private foundation comes not so much from any positive
inducements offered in the Code as from an awareness on the part
of some givers that the retention of control over wealth is itself
worth something. What the Code does permit is a contribution
to a controlled charity (with a deduction of the value of the gift
from taxable income), without a surrender of one of the most im-
portant attributes of ownership-management. For most purposes, a
donor's gift to his own incorporated charitable pocketbook is treated
in the same manner as a gift to a wholly independent charity.9 The
7,000 foundations which were too small to be included (assets averaging less than
$14,000) ; an educated guess would be that about 5,000 of those are family founda-
tions. Id. at 11.
7 See 107 Cong. Rec. 13752 (1961); Patman Report (first installment), supra,
note 2, at 1 (reporting this figure erroneously as the total number of tax-exempt
foundations; the figure includes many more welfare or religious organizations, for
e.xample, than foundations). In 1962 the figure reached 54,751. See McGreevy,
"Review of Rulings and Forms for Reporting," in Sixth Biennial N.Y.U. Conference
on Charitable Foundations, at 175, 200 (1963).
8 Another estimate is that the "current annual rate of foundation exemption
applications allowed by the Service is about 1,200." Id. at 184. "It is estimated that
there are now between 14,000 and 15,000 tax-exempt foundations required to file
Form 990-A." Id. at 200.
9 The 1964 Revenue Act does make two distinctions: (a) The limitation on the
charitable contribution deduction to 20% of adjusted gross income (in § 170(b) of
the Code) was extended to 30% for all contributions to charities supported by gov-
ernment or by public contributions. For gifts to private foundations, the limitation
remains at 20%7. (b) The unlimited charitable deduction-for persons who regularly
give to charity nearly all their after-tax income-is allowed only with respect to
contributions to (i) public charities; (ii) charities which operate actively, devoting
more than half their assets and substantially all their income to active charitable
operations; and (iii) charities which expend at least half of the donor's contributions
on active operations or on "conduit" gifts to other public charities. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 170(g). See note 47, infra.
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question is whether the exemption and deduction provisions of
the tax law establishing that treatment should be revised. The
conclusion reached in this article is that such a revision is overdue.
When a taxpayer whose highest personal income tax rate is
fifty per cent makes a gift to his own private charity, the United
States Government effectively contributes half the gift.10 This pub-
lic contribution is usually explained
on the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would other-
wise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."
The proposition may also be stated negatively: if an organiza-
tion, purportedly charitable, does not engage in activities which
broadly benefit the public, then the loss of governmental revenue
is not offset, and exemption or deductions or both should be denied.
Some portions of the present Code already reflect an understanding
that the public's need for governmental revenue must be weighed
against the public's interest in promoting private charity-even
when there is no doubting the charity's worth to the public. The
twenty to thirty per cent limitation on income tax deductions, for
example, is designed to strike such a balance. A similar frank
recognition of the competition between these two interests ought
to attend the analysis of other aspects of the law governing tax
exemption.
The principal argument in favor of exemption for donor-
controlled foundations is that the exemption encourages charitable
giving on a scale greater than that which would result if donors
were not permitted to retain control over the property given. The
argument is not demonstrable, nor can it be disproved, for it rests
on an estimate of the state of mind of thousands of donors and
potential donors, each in a different planning context. Nevertheless,
the assertion seems a good guess. Still, the assumption that there
would be a reduction in charitable giving if the exemption were
denied to donor-controlled foundations does not compel the con-
clusion that such foundations should be exempt. Against the
expected losses in reduced charitable contributions must be bal-
anced the public's expected gain in revenue from the denial of
exemption and the denial of deductions (for income, gift and
10 The assumption here is that the gift itself is not large enough to change the
tax rate; i.e., that the 50% rate applies after deducting for the contribution.
11 H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., vol 1, p. 742 (1938).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(b) (1). Cf. § 170(b) (2) (5% limitation for
corporations). See note 9, supra.
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estate tax purposes) for contributions made to the controlled
foundations. Just how much revenue is involved is not known,
and is not likely to be known even if the Internal Revenue Service
should decide to make a detailed survey of the receipts and opera-
tions of foundations.' 3  It does not seem unreasonable, however,
to estimate that the average taxpayer who contributes to his own
foundation deducts his contribution from income which would
otherwise be taxable at a rate of at least fifty per cent. To put it
another way, it is fair to assume that the public has contributed at
least half of the money now in the hands of donor-controlled foun-
dations. Whether the government could make more effective use of
its lost revenue than family foundations make of their resources
is another question. For the present it is enough to recognize that
the discouragement of some kinds of charitable giving would not
be an unmixed loss to the public.'4
It is true, as Dr. Andrews has said, that "Nearly all of the
large general research foundations of today began as family founda-
tions, with limited funds oriented to the personal charities of their
donors." I" But if the intended implication is that it is necessary
to foster a thousand incorporated pocketbooks in order to get one
Ford Foundation out of the lot, the reasoning is unpersuasive. The
13 Apparently in response to expressions of congressional interest, the Service
began in February, 1962, and "expanded audit program" designed to audit many more
exempt organizations than had previously been audited, perhaps 10,000 in 1963. See
Rogovin, "Methods and Objectives of the Revenue Service's Audit Program for
Exempt Organizations" in N.Y.U. Sixth Biennial Conference on Charitable Founda-
tions, at 229, 237-40 (1963). Nonetheless, it is still true, as the Reece Committee
noted, that "No comprehensive statistics are available .... the service would have
been unable to produce complete statistics except at prohibitive cost in labor and
money." H.R. Rep. No. 2681, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1955). Even at such cost,
statistics on revenue loss would have to be based on some guessing, since the revenue
lost because of deductions for contributions to foundations depends on the various
tax rates applicable to all donors as well as the amounts contributed.
In an era of nearly unbroken deficits, there is great pressure on the Service, both
from Congress and from the Administration, to keep revenue production at a maxi-
mum. Yet for "every man-year spent on [examinations of exempt organizations]
there is a potential loss of approximately $175,000 otherwise produced from income
tax audits." Rogovin, supra, at 237. Repeated suggestions have been made for
statistically oriented audits which might produce significant data concerning exempt
organizations. The revenue-loss figures noted by Mr. Rogovin are part of the reason
why "the facts are not easily unearthed" concerning self-dealing and other uses of
foundation resources for private gain. Sacks, "Use and Misuse of the Private
Foundation," in N.Y.U. Fifth Biennial Conference on Charitable Foundations 203,
at 214 (1961).
14 Cf. Lynn, "The Questionable Testamentary Gift to Charity: A Suggested
Approach to Judicial Decision," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1963).
15 Andrews, supra note 6, at 25.
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Ford Foundation did come into existence with a relatively small
endowment, before the deaths of Henry Ford I and Edsel Ford;
that does not mean that there never would have been a Ford
Foundation if donor control had been a ground for denial of
exemption. From the point of view of the attorney who is planning
a large estate, the chief advantage of having an existing organiza-
tion to which property may be given at death is that the question
of the organization's exemption can be settled before the gift is
made. The same assurance can be obtained by establishing a
foundation which is independent of the control of the donor and
his family.
The family foundation is nonetheless frequently recommended
as a device for avoiding the loss of control over a family business
when the owner of the business dies; the case of the Ford Founda-
tion is a regularly cited example. A gift of corporate stock to a
family foundation decreases death taxes and may avoid the neces-
sity of selling stock to outsiders in order to pay the taxes. If the
family controls the foundation, the business remains free from
outside influence on the management. 16 Granting that such a use
of a charitable organization is not of itself undesirable, one may
still question whether it is necessary for the family to control the
foundation in order to accomplish the desired business and estate-
planning purpose. If non-voting stock is used, as the Fords used it,
the gift can be made to an independent charity and management
control over -the business will remain in the family, which retains
all the voting stock. The principal estate planning justification
for using a controlled foundation will thus be satisfied. The main
disadvantages to the family are two: first, the independent chari-
table shareholder will take an interest in the management of the
business; even if it has no vote, it may have to be consulted.
Second, the family will lose its management of the wealth given
to charity. Whether such a loss is justified is the very question we
are trying to resolve.
A related argument for exempting the family foundation has
been that it permits a taxpayer whose income varies greatly from
year to year to make his maximum percentage contribution to the
foundation (to take his maximum deduction) each year, but to
make contributions at a level rate from the foundation to the
16 See, e.g., Fraser, "Charitable Giving as an Element in Planning Lifetime and
Testamentary Giving," in 19th Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation 751, 799-800 (1961);
Thompson, "Family Charitable Foundations-Administration," in 1957 So. Calif. Tax
Inst. 665, 688-90; Casey, "Estate Planning by the Donor: Perpetuating Control; Pro-
vision for Family," in Second Biennial N.Y.U. Conference on Charitable Foundations
at 131 (1955).
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operating charities he wants to support. Achieving this relatively
harmless result 17 under the present system depends on the avail-
ability of an exempt, donor-controlled organization. Three years
ago, Professor Albert Sacks suggested that the donor's need for lev-
eling his charitable contributions might "be met by the carry-back
and carry-forward device." I Now that the Congress has made such
a device available to individual donors, one of the most important
justifications for the "conduit" type of foundation has disappeared.
The arguments in favor of exempting donor-controlled founda-
tions are not decisive. They rest, finally, on the proposition that
what is not plainly undesirable should not be prohibited, a propo-
sition which is unconvincing when the issue is not prohibition but
the denial of exceptionally favored treatment by the tax laws.
Against these arguments must be considered not only the
revenue loss to the public, but also the opportunities and tempta-
tions created by donor control for engaging in self-dealing. The
most obviously undesirable kind of self-dealing is that which results
in disadvantage to the controlled charity, jeopardizing the public's
interest in the charity's funds. Less obvious but equally worthy
of public concern are dealings between a donor and his controlled
foundation which may not harm the foundation's interests, but
which do result in private advantage to the donor.
For example, the family foundation may buy, or may have
contributed to it, shares in the family business. An independent
foundation would be expected to make decisions concerning the
management of the business on the basis of its fiduciaries' best
estimate of investment and business policy. Conversely, a founda-
tion which is not independent of its donor-creator may be caused
to vote its stock (or other interest) for the purposes of the donor.
A corporation which was once owned entirely by a family, but
which has now "gone public," may have to decide whether to pay
dividends; the family's control over the foundation may be decisive
in the voting of shareholders. The abuse in such a situation is not
simply that the foundation may not be managed for the maximum
profit; it is, more importantly, that the public's resources are being
used to prefer one private interest over another.19
17 But not absolutely harmless. Funds contributed in one year but not distributed
to operating charities until later years are not truly devoted to charity while they
are lying in the foundation's bank account.
18 Sacks, supra note 13, at 215. Even before the 1964 act, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 170(b) (2) provided a two-year carry-forvard for corporations which made chari-
table contributions in excess of the 5% limit. The 1964 act extended that period
to five years, and added a similar five-year carry-forward for individuals in
§ 170(b) (5), a new provision.
19 In 1954, the Roy Fruehaf Foundation guaranteed an investment by the Team-
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When a controlled foundation buys corporate stock and votes
it for the purpose of aiding the donor in a contest for control of the
corporation, there are two arguments available under present law
for the denial of the foundation's exemption. One is that the
organization is not operated exclusively for its exempt purposes.0
The other, provided that the foundation buys the stock out of its
income, is that there has been either an unreasonable accumulation
of income or a use of income "to a substantial degree" for non-
exempt purposes. 2' Neither argument has been tested in court, but
neither seems likely to prevail. The present law is premised on the
view that private advantage along the way is not objectionable so
long as the funds of a controlled charity ultimately get to their
charitable destination. There are occasional flashes of disagree-
sters union in stock in the Fruehaf Trailer Company, bought for the purpose of
allowing Mr. Fruehaf to vote the stock in a proxy contest. See Ross, "Foundations
Established by Individuals," in 14th Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation at 115, 118-19
(1956). Still another example of the use of public resources for private profit is the
purchase by a controlled foundation of stock in a competitor or a supplier of the
donor's business. Under present law, there is little reason to fear loss of exemption
as a result of such a transaction. Cf. Cummins-Collins Foundation, 15 T.C. 613
(1950) (foundation exempt although it lent money to enable creditors to buy out
a competitor). But cf. Lesavoy Foundation, 25 T.C. 924, rev'd on other grounds, 238
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956) (use of foundation's funds to buy an outside business, assur-
ing donor's business a source of supply, held to justify denial of exemption). Other
similar abuses, none of them unknown to the world of controlled foundations, are:
the sale to the foundation of hard-to-dispose-of assets; the use of the foundation to
market appreciated property; the contribution of foundation funds to a city on con-
dition that the city perform certain "public" works for the benefit of the controlling
donor's business; the use of foundation funds to build a building which is leased
to the donor's business at a low rental; the use of the foundation as a conduit to
transfer property to children at a higher basis (donor gives appreciated stock to
foundation, taking a market-value deduction, and not realizing taxable income on
the appreciation; foundation sells at market value to donor's children, whose basis
is thus higher than their father's); the making of loans from the foundation to a
customer of the donor's business; the gift of art objects to the foundation, which
permits the donor to hold the objects (in his living room) for safe-keeping; use of
foundation funds to make a contribution to an exempt nursing home, which then
takes the controlling donor's relative in without charge [probably, although not
certainly, a violation of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c) (6)]. For some spectacular
examples of the use of foundation funds to finance the private dealings of the con-
trolling donor, see Patman Report (second installment), supra note 2. For examples
which have received judicial approval or disapproval, see Weithorn & Noall, "Dealings
Between Donor and Foundation," in Sixth Biennial N.Y.U. Conference on Charitable
Foundations at 129, 145-54 (1963). See also Patman Report (first installment), supra
note 2, at 79-82.
20 The argument rests on Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(c) (3). Cf. Best Lock
Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959) ; Lesavoy Foundation, supra note 19.
21 Either use of income would violate Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 504(a).
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ment,22 but generally the old Trinidad rule2 3 still applies when
there is no specific statutory provision to the contrary.
That rule is just as unfortunate now as it was before the 1950
Revenue Act removed some of its worst features.24 It is not
enough to prevent private advantage which is obtained at the
expense of a foundation's exempt purposes. What is necessary is
the termination of special tax privileges for anyone who uses
charitable funds-public funds-for the advantage of a narrow
group. The argument is not odd or unusual; the principle that
tax-supported public funds and public property must be devoted
to a public use, and may not be devoted to private uses, runs
through the law of eminent domain and municipal corporations.
When it is added that the family foundation does nothing for the
public which would not also be accomplished by direct contribu-
tions from donors to operating charities, 5 the case against the
exemption of donor-controlled foundations is amply made.
Proposals for reform legislation fall into two groups. First,
there is a plain need to tighten the prohibited transactions pro-
visions of the Code, whatever may be decided about changing the
rules concerning donor control. Second, there are several possi-
bilities for modifying or abandoning the present rule of exemption
for donor-controlled foundations. The remainder of this article
considers the implications of various alternative reforms of both
types.
II. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS
A. The Transactions Forbidden. Even before 1950, exempt
22 As in the Tax Court's decision in Lesavoy Foundation, supra note 19.
23 Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924), held that
the religious order did not lose its exemption just because it engaged in "limited
trading" which was "incidental" to the order's purposes. Cf. Cone v. McGinnes,
63-2 USTC f1 9551 (E.D. Pa.) (religious bookstore).
24 By taxing the unrelated business income of charities, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 511-14, and by forbidding the unreasonable accumulation of their income, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 504(a) (1). See Note, "The Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A
Critique and a Proposal," 59 Yale L.J. 477, 492-97 (1950).
25 There are a few family foundations which are themselves operating charities,
with professional staffs and regular programs for running homes for the aged,
making scholarship awards and the like. The dangers of abuse of the tax exemption
are lower in such cases, not only because most institutional charities are under the
supervision of state agencies, but also because they are often related to particular
potential beneficiaries who take an interest in what they are doing. As to such
donor-controlled foundations, proposals for taking away the exemption are probably
unfounded. Such foundations are few enough in number, however, that it may be
more trouble to exempt them than they are worth-particularly since the majority
of such foundations would no doubt convert to "independence" upon the adoption of
a rule which denied exemption to donor-controlled foundations.
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foundations were required to be "organized and operated exclu-
sively for" their charitable, etc., purposes, and "no part" of their
net earnings might inure "to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual . *.".." 2 These two complementary provisions were
used to deny exemption to organizations which engaged in activi-
ties rather similar to those proscribed by the prohibited transac-
tions section of the 1950 act.2 7 Thus, in Mabee Petroleum Corp.
v. United States,28 a feeder corporation, otherwise probably exempt,
was held not to be exempt because it had agreed to pay a salary
of $100,000 per year for fifteen years to the man who was its
president and manager. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the District
Court that the salary was unreasonably high, and that "such pay-
ments resulted in the inurement of a part of the net earnings of"
the corporation to the president 9.2  The court added: "We think
it doubtful whether comparable services would have cost as much
had they been acquired in an arms-length transaction from an
outside source." 80
After some colorful hearings, 3' the House of Representatives
passed a revenue revision bill including a prohibited transactions
provision which would have denied exemption unless the organiza-
tion was operated so that:
(A) no part of its income or corpus is loaned to;
(B) no compensation, other than a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered is paid to;
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101 (6) ; now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501 (c) (3).
(Emphasis added.)
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3813; now Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 503(c).
28 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953) (2-1 decision).
29 Id. at 875.
30 Id. at 876. Cf. Gemological Institute of America, 17 T.C. 1604 (1952), aff'd
per curian, 212 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1954) (exemption denied to the Institute because
it paid the man who was its dominant figure a salary of $4,500 per year plus 509
of its net profits); Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc., 39 T.C. 93 (1962), aff'd on
all exempt org. grounds, rev'd as to other issues, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 84 S. Ct. 1135, rehearing denied, 84 S. Ct. 1179 (1964) (foundation partici-
pated in construction projects and so was not operated exclusively for charitable
purposes; no mention of prohibited transactions section). For similar holdings based
on pre-1950 law, see Lesavoy Foundation, supra note 19; Best Lock Corp., supra
note 20 ("substantial activities" in behalf of creator; also involved post-1950 years).
Cf. Texas Trade School, 30 T.C. 642 (1958) (excessive rent paid by a school to four
of its officers and another man); Cleveland Chiropractic College, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1 (1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1963). But cf. Home Oil Mill v. Willing-
ham, 68 F.Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1946).
31 Hearings Before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reported in S. Rep. No. 101,
supra note 2. See Note, supra note 24.
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(C) no part of its services is made available on a prefer-
ential basis to;(D) no substantial purchase of securities or any other
property is made by it from; and
(E) no substantial part of its securities or other property
is sold to
substantial donors, officers or trustees of the organization, or to
members of their families or to corporations under their control
(defined to mean fifty per cent stock ownership). The same stand-
ards were required to be made a part of ,the governing instrument
of an exempt organization in order for a gift to the organization to
be deductible. 2
The House bill thus made self-dealing by charitable donors
and fiduciaries a ground for denial of exemption, without reference
to the fairness of the dealings. In choosing a rule of strict prohibi-
tion, the House bill simply adopted well-established principles of
trust law. A trustee who is guilty of self-dealing which has not
been ratified by the beneficiary (and in the case of a charity, there
is no one to ratify) is an insurer for any losses incurred by the
trust, and is accountable for any gains which he receives. 33  The
House bill accepted what the law of trusts had recognized for cen-
turies: it is easier to forbid all self-dealing than it is to police all
trustees' conduct in the hope of catching those who have abused
their trust.
The Senate's version of the prohibited transactions provision
in 1950 was superficially appealing. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee reported:
Your committee is in sympathy with the goals sought by the above
provisions of the House bill but believes they would be unduly
harsh in their application. No objection is seen to engaging in
transactions with donors if these transactions are carried out at
arm's length.34
To remove the "harshness" of the House bill, the Senate proposed
to prohibit loans to donors, etc., only if they should be made
without adequate security; to prohibit purchases by donors from
exempt organizations only if the consideration should be inade-
quate; and to prohibit sales by donors to exempt organizations
only if the consideration should be excessive. The Senate's version
-which was enacted as part of the 1950 act and is now embodied
in the Code as section 503 (c)-amounted to little more than
embroidery on the existing requirement of exclusive organization
32 The bill is reprinted in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 469-73.
33 See generally 2 Scott, Trusts § 206 (2d ed. 1956).
34 Reprinted in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 510.
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and operation for charitable purposes and the existing prohibition
on diversion of an exempt organization's net income to a private
individual. When the Senate removed the House bill's "harshness,"
it removed all independent effect from the prohibited transactions
provisions. The Internal Revenue Service has given ample demon-
stration of this judgment; the nearly invariable practice of the Serv-
ice, when it comes across dealings which might be called prohibited
transactions, is to base its revocation of exemption on the general
terms of section 501(c) (3) as well as the prohibited transactions
ground.
Not only does the prohibited transactions section have no
independent vitality as a protection for an organization's exempt
purposes; it may even be argued that the addition of these pro-
visions to the Code gives some encouragement to conduct of ques-
tionable desirability. In speaking of the companion provision of
section 504, the Tax Court has properly remarked that the Code's
denial of exemption for unreasonable accumulations "would seem
to recognize the possibility of an exempt organization making
reasonable accumulations." 3' So also, the prohibition on loans for
less than "adequate" security and "reasonable" interest may encour-
age the making of loans which qualify under section 503 (c) (1)
but which are nonetheless not the best available investment for the
exempt organization. Yet it will take a strong showing of abuse
to convince a court that such a "permissible transaction" justifies
revocation of the exemption. If it were not for the danger that
precisely the wrong inference might be drawn, it is arguable that
the prohibited transactions rules should be repealed, so that the
courts might spell out their own principles of fiduciary duty within
the general framework of section 501(c) (3).
Even if it might be assumed that the prohibited transactions
section has some force of its own, the vagueness of the section's
prohibitions detracts from its usefulness. The adequacy of security
and the reasonableness of an interest rate, for example, are matters
about which business judgments differ. "The money market" is
an abstraction which is convenient for some purposes, but it hinders
analysis if it is allowed to obscure the fact that on a given day in
a given community different lenders will be prepared to lend
money at different rates of interest and upon security which varies
35 John Danz Charitable Trust, 32 T.C. 469, 479 (1959), aff'd on other grounds,
284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1961). But cf. Kenner v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 632 (7th
Cir. 1963), holding that the exemption of hospitals, etc., from the predecessor of § 503
did not work a similar exemption from the provisions of the predecessor of
§ 501 (c) (3).
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in form and amount.36  If "adequate" security and "reasonable"
interest are meaningful at all in such a context, they must mean
something like "the lowest interest rate and the least security
which a borrower might be required to give to a commercial or
other lender, other conditions being equal." That definition would
leave the provision as a protection against only the most flagrant
and obvious breaches of fiduciary duty, but insistence on a higher
standard is hard to square with the terms of the Code. Similar
arguments may be made as to the prohibited transactions provisions
dealing with compensation for services and self-dealing other than
loans. They add up to a lowest-common-denominator standard of
enforcement.
Apart from the uncertainty inherent in its use of concepts of
reasonableness, the prohibited transactions section may be faulted
for other omissions and ambiguities. There is a special prohibition
against unfair loans from the foundation to a condemned person,
for example, but no corresponding prohibition against unfair loans
from a condemned person to the foundation-say, at an excessive
interest rate. Such transactions may have been left out in 1950
because they were (and are) so clearly violative of section
501 (c) (3), or because the House bill was aimed at absolute pro-
hibitions against some forms of self-dealing; there has been no
suggestion that all loans by a donor to his foundation be pro-
hibited.3 7  Presumably an unfair transaction of this kind would
amount to a "diversion" of the foundation's income or corpus
within the meaning of section 503 (c) (6), but-given the present
orientation of the section-there is no good reason for making
specific reference to one kind of loan and not to the other.3 8
36 See Donald G. Griswold, 39 T.C. 620 (1962). These and other require-
ments of the prohibited transactions provisions are ably analyzed in Young, "Donor
Foundation Dealings," in 22nd Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation 965 (1964).
37 During the first year of operation, while foundations have been awaiting their
exemption letters, donor-to-foundation loans have been common. Such a foundation
needs some funds to get started, but the donor is reluctant to make substantial con-
tributions pending a determination of deductibility. The one-year wait was aban-
doned by the Service last year. Rev. Proc. 63-30, 1963 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 52, at 51.
38 The word "diversion" has been read by one worried commentator to forbid
a purchase of property by a foundation to be paid for out of the property's income,
as when a condemned person sells stock to his foundation, reserving the right to
apply future dividends to the purchase price. See Powell, "Problems of the Tax
Exempt Organization," in 13th Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Taxation at 807, 813 (1955).
It is hard to see why § 503 should cause any more concern in this regard than
the provision of § 501 (c) (3) that no part of the income may inure to the benefit of a
private individual. Surely the "diversion" portion of § 503 should be limited to unfair
diversions, in line with the canon ejusdem generis. See Weyher & Bolton, "Loss of
Charitable Status Because of Prohibited Transactions and Unreasonable Accumula-
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Another omission relates to the case of the family foundation
which owns stock in a corporation. When the corporation lends
money to the donor-creator of the foundation, should there be a
similar requirement of adequacy of security and interest? Or have
we now reached the limit to which the tax law should be stretched
in the interest of fiduciary duty?39
The prohibited transactions section as it now stands seems to
have been drafted on the optimistic assumption that exempt organ-
izations would be subjected to regular audits of a fairly detailed
nature. The vague standards of reasonableness are flexible enough
so that only the most careful scrutiny of an organization's records
is likely to turn up evidence of a violation-and even under those
conditions there will be violations which are missed. The absence
in most states of any effective supervision of private charities by
state officials 40 makes the discovery of prohibited transactions
difficult, for the Internal Revenue Service has never been able to
devote enough personnel to exempt organizations to do a compre-
hensive job of policing them.41 Congress must decide whether
permitting what the Senate committee hopefully called "arm's
tions," in Second Biennial N.Y.U. Conference on Charitable Foundations 55, 60-62
(1955). Accord, Shiffman Foundation, 32 T.C. 1073 (1959).
39 By reaching, one may argue that § 503(c)(1) contains two other loop-
holes: (1) Suppose a donor lends money to his own controlled corporation without
security and at no interest, and then contributes the note to his foundation. Is it
really the foundation which lends the money? The only abuse in such a situation
comes at the time the donor takes an income tax deduction for his contribution; if
the note is valued at its face value, then the public loses, but if the note is properly
discounted to its commercial value, there is no abuse. (2) It is apparently possible
to read this language to mean that "In order to fall within the provision, the loan
must be both inadequately secured and bear a rate of interest lower than reasonable."
Powell, "Foundations: Prohibited Activities," in 14th Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax-
ation at 61, 67 (1956). Although the wording of the section is plainly opposed to
the suggested reading, perhaps-assuming more drastic changes are not to be made--
the language should be amended to make unmistakably clear that both reasonable
interest and adequate security are required when a foundation makes a loan to a
condemned person.
40 See Taylor, Public Accountability of Foundations and Charitable Trusts
(1953); Karst, supra note 3; D'Amours, "State Supervision of Charities: Present
Status," 4 N.H. Bar. J. 76 (1962); Fremont-Smith, "Government Supervision and
Accountability of Foundations," in Sixth Biennial N.Y.U. Conference on Charitable
Foundations, at 69 (1963). Congressman Patman, noting past inadequacies in state
supervision, has said: "Consideration should be given to a [federal] regulatory
agency for the supervision of tax-exempt foundations." Patman Report (first install-
ment), supra note 2, at 134.
41 But see Rogovin, supra note 13. The information return form (990-A), has
been modified in order to improve the required disclosure of certain transactions of
exempt organizations. See McGreevy, supra note 7, at 192-213.
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length" transactions 42 is sufficiently important to justify either
the toleration of transactions which are not the equivalent of arm's
length dealings or the high cost of enforcing the present stand-
ards. One or the other of these two alternatives is inevitable if the
law remains as it is.
Paragraphs (3) and (6) of section 503 (c), forbidding the
foundation to make its services available to a condemned person
on a preferential basis or to divert its income or corpus substan-
tially to him, should no doubt be retained as catch-all provisions.
The reasonable compensation limitation probably cannot be made
more specific, although as the language now stands it invites an
interpretation which reads in the case law on corporate officers'
salaries.43 The issue in the case of a foundation is not related to
the special corporate problem of salaries as a substitute for divi-
dends, and there is no reason to assume that the same considera-
tions govern the reasonableness of salaries, but to add a phrase
like "in view of the duties performed" would no doubt be con-
sidered a redundancy.
It is clear, however, that the law should not remain unchanged.
The 1950 House bill, if adopted now, would change the other three
paragraphs of section 503(c), forbidding all foundation-to-donor
loans,44 all purchases 4 and all sales46 of the self-dealing variety.
Those changes are justified, regardless of any legislative attack on
donor control. While the withdrawal of exemption from donor-
controlled foundations would go far to reduce the temptation and
the opportunity for self-dealing, the probable availability of in-
formal control arrangements which would satisfy any legislative
definition of independence make it necessary to prohibit self-
dealing in a separate provision. The 1964 act contains the germ
of this proposal, now applicable only to a tiny handful of charitable
donors, but capable of extension to all of them.47
42 It has been pointed out frequently that this language is misleading. One
cannot deal at arm's length with himself. He may, however, arrange a transaction
which is fair, in the sense that it is the equivalent of a deal which might be made
with another at arm's length, and presumably that is what the committee had
in mind.
43 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c) (2). See Railway Equipment Co. v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
44 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c) (1). Such a prohibition is imposed on founda-
tion-to-fiduciary loans by the American Law Institute's Model Non-Profit Corporation
Act, § 27 (revised 1957). See 32 Ill. Ann. Stat. § 163a 26 for the corresponding pro-
vision of Illinois' version of the act.
45 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c) (4).
46 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c) (5).
47 In its provisions concerning the unlimited charitable deduction, the 1964 act
adds a new set of restrictions analogous to those in the prohibited transactions
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Senate committee to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
not possible to deal with oneself at arm's length, however a trans-
action may resemble arm's length dealing. A ban on all self-dealing
would be an improvement over the present scheme in three ways:
(i) It would avoid some temptation to some donors to engage in
dealings which do not resemble arm's length deals. When founda-
tions are founded for essentially non-charitable motives, and when
some kinds of self-dealing for private advantage are permitted, it
takes a substantial degree of self-restraint on the part of the donor
to refrain from engaging in other kinds of self-dealing for private
advantage. The money was once his by right;4" it may still be his
to control, even though "independent" trustees are nominally in
charge. (ii) The proposed ban on self-dealing would be easier to
enforce than are the present vague standards of reasonableness,
which make virtually the entire financial and institutional environ-
ment relevant. Because violations of the proposed absolute ban
would be easier to spot, there would certainly be fewer cases of
"unpunished" self-dealing to the detriment of the foundations than
there are now. (iii) The use of public resources for private advan-
tage would be avoided, and thus there would be a social gain
irrespective of any disadvantages to the foundation.
On the other side, what would be lost if such a ban were
enacted? Something might be lost to donors who wished to trade
with their own foundations, but the loss to the foundations-that
is, to the public-would be minimal. The foundation, especially
if it is corporate, is not limited to the "legal list" from which trus-
tees must often choose their investments. 0 Within the limits
of section 504(a)(3), prohibiting investment of accumulated in-
come in such a way as to jeopardize the foundation's exempt pur-
poses, and those of section 501(c)(3), which arguably impose
similar limits on the investment of corpus, a foundation may choose
from a wide range of prospective investments.50 A foundation need
section. A contribution qualifies for the unlimited deduction only if the recipient
organization does not, during its taxable year including receipt of the gift or during
its three preceding and three following taxable years, engage in a "disqualifying
transaction." These include any loan to a donor or members of his family or his
employee; any purchase from or sale to the donor, etc., of "more than a minimal
amount" of property or securities; any payment of compensation to the donor, etc.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170 (g) (4). See note 9, supra.
48 Even a court may make the mistake of equating funds of a controlled founda-
tion with the donor's "own moneys." See George Pepperdine Foundation v.
Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 160, 271 P.2d 600, 604, hearing denied, 126 Cal.
App. 2d at 164 (1954).
49 See, e.g., N.Y. Membership Corp. Law § 27.
50 Compare Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957) with
John Danz Charitable Trust, supra note 35.
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not invest in its donor's business, or lend him money, for want of
other investment opportunities.
Correspondingly, the donor himself loses little if the "arm's
length" standard really is applied. If he is prepared to give ade-
quate security and pay reasonable interest when he borrows, and
if he really will (as fiduciary) foreclose on himself (as borrower),
then a loan on the same terms can be obtained through regular
banking channels. When a donor borrows from his own foundation
rather than from a bank, the inference is hard to avoid that he is
using the foundation because he knows that it can be counted on
not to be too hard on him.r" The tax law should be brought into
line with the law of charitable trusts, and self-dealing should be
prohibited.
B. Condemned Persons. But whose self-dealing? The present
law lists the following condemned persons: "2
(i) the "creator" of the foundation (only if it is a trust);
(ii) a substantial contributor to the foundation;
(iii) a member of the family of either of the above (and
"family" is defined 53 to include only the creator's, etc., broth-
ers and sisters, spouse, ancestors and lineal descendants); or
(iv) a corporation, fifty per cent or more of the voting
control or the value of shares of which is owned by the creator,
etc.
Without question, this list should be augmented; it ignores some
obvious forms of domination, and some which are not so obvious.
Furthermore, the present list can use some additional specificity.
Taking these suggestions in reverse order, the very first cate-
gory of condemned persons is curiously ambiguous. The term
"creator" does not have application to a corporation: whether the
coverage of the prohibited transactions section should be extended
to "'creators" of corporations depends on what is meant by the
51 Years ago, the American-Scandinavian Foundation held mortgage bonds of
the Hecla Iron Works of Brooklyn, the principal donor's company. In 1921, the
company's position worsened; there were defaults, followed by extensions granted
by the foundation. The factory closed in 1926; in 1927, the foundation realized just
under $95,000 on bonds of a face value of $295,000. The 1928 annual report of the
foundation said: "One consideration in the minds of the trustees in 1924 when the bonds
matured was that they did not wish earlier than necessary to embarrass the Hecla Iron
Works." p. 4, quoted in Tunks, The Modern Philanthropic Foundation and Private
Property 141-42 (unpublished graduate thesis in Yale Law Library, 1947).
Now that we are more sophisticated and more regulated, such a statement is not
likely to appear in an annual report. Still, it would be surprising to find that the
attitudes of donors and their controlled foundations have changed radically.
52 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(c).
53 By reference to Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(c) (4).
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'term. Who is the creator of a trust? Surely the term includes the
settlor. Does it also include the person who makes a declaration
of trust (perhaps a bank, to which the prospective trust res has
been transferred)? The Code's wording suggests a wish to get
away from legal terminology with established meaning," but no
alternative meaning is indicated. The category of "substantial
contributor" seems to include one who supplies the property which
becomes the trust res, but perhaps the settlor is the creator of the
trust, and other persons who may later contribute to the res are
the substantial contributors. Probably the best solution is to drop
the word "creator" from the section and to spell out that it is
intended to include the person who makes the initial contribution
to a charitable trust or corporation, whatever he is called under
state law, as well as anyone else who makes a substantial contribu-
tion thereafter.55 The word "substantial" probably cannot be
improved upon, although it must vary in meaning according to
the size of the charity in question.
The following persons should be added to the list of the
condemned:
(i) the charitable fiduciaries: trustees, directors, officers;
(ii) partners of the contributor, etc.; his employees, or
employees of his controlled corporation;
(iii) the persons who control any corporation which
makes a substantial contribution to the foundation;
(iv) aunts and uncles; nieces and nephews; sons- daugh-
ters- and parents-in-law; the parents of sons- and daughters-
in-law;
(v) any corporation or other entity controlled by the
foundation. 5
Both in the list of condemned persons as it now reads and
in the above proposal for extension, there are references to con-
trolled corporations. The attribution rules of section 267(c) should
be substituted for the phrase "directly or indirectly" now used.
Furthermore, the fifty per cent figure in the present wording seems
too high; voting control may be achieved at a lower percentage
even in some fairly small corporations. If, for enforcement reasons,
an arbitrary percentage is needed, perhaps twenty-five per cent
54 Perhaps it was intended simply to include other expressions for the settlor,
such as "trustor," the term often used in California.
5 The law should make clear that if several persons make such contributions,
all are condemned; the present use of the singular ("the creator") leaves room for
dispute. See Powell, supra note 39, at 64.
56 See Caruth Foundation v. Campbell, 60-2 USTC 9780. (N.D. Texas 1960),
on appeal by the government to the Fifth Circuit, CCHI 1964 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
70,806.
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would be more appropriate. But if the enforcement machinery can
stand to make the inquiry, the test for control suggested by
two congressional committees in 1954 in another context seems
appropriate:
any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable
and however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the
control which is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise.57
Finally, some specific reference should be made in the provi-
sion listing condemned persons to dealings made through other
unrelated persons who act as conduits. The Service and the courts
will surely read such an interpretation in, even if it is not expressed,
but it would be better to be sure. The phrase "directly or in-
directly" is hackneyed, but it would serve.
C. Sanctions. The present prohibited transactions section
lacks effective sanctions. The discovery of a prohibited transaction
results in the revocation of exemption under section 503(a), but
the revocation relates only to taxable years after notice is given
by the Commissioner (and there is usually a period of at least a
year between the transaction and notice-maybe more),
unless such organization entered into such prohibited transaction
with the purpose of diverting corpus or income of the organiza-
tion from its exempt purposes, and such transaction involved a
substantial part of the corpus or income of such organization. 58
The corresponding provision denying deductions (for gifts made
to an organization which has engaged in a prohibited transaction)
is also limited to prospective operation, with a similar exception
for intentional wrongdoing when the donor who claims the deduc-
tion is a party to the prohibited transaction. 9 Thus while the
most serious revenue losses with respect to an exempt foundation
are likely to result from the deductions taken by the donor when
he makes his donations, still it is only the exceptional prohibited
transaction which permits the retroactive denial of deductions,
under the prohibited transactions section.
Perhaps deductions may be denied retroactively, however, if
the Commissioner relies on the general requirements of section
501(c)(3), arguing that the foundation was not organized and
operated exclusively for its exempt purposes. The Regulations
note 0 that the requirements of this section and those of the pro-
7 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. A65 (1954) ; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1954).
58 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(a) (2).
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503(e).
0 Treas. Reg. § 1.503(a)-i (1958).
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
hibited transactions section are cumulative, not alternative, and
the Code should say so explicitly. A retroactive denial of exemp-
tion is permitted if the original recognition of exemption was based
on a "mistake of law."'" However, although the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel does not prevent the Commissioner from correcting
such a mistake, he is limited in the exercise of his discretion, and
he may not revoke an earlier exemption ruling retroactively if the
conduct of the organization is not such as to "estop" it from relying
on the original ruling, and if it has done nothing to conceal the
activities relied on by the Commissioner to deny exemption. 6
Of course, if the organization "changes character" and fails to
notify the Service, exemption may be denied retroactively to the
time of the change.
In the Auto Club opinion 6 3 Mr. Justice Brennan distinguishes
the Lesavoy case64 in such a way as to make clear that the question
to be decided in each case is whether the Commissioner has abused
his discretion in revoking the exemption retroactively. The opinion
hints, but does not expressly state, that a ruling recognizing the
exemption of an organization which later engages in a prohibited
transaction will be regarded as a ruling based on a mistake of law,
and thus come within the rule of the Auto Club case. The two
situations are distinguishable. In the Auto Club case, the Com-
missioner's earlier ruling was based on a mistake as to the organi-
zation and operation of the club, neither of which underwent any
change. In the case of a prohibited transaction, however, while
the foundation may be properly organized and operated for a time,
the prohibited transaction changes the operation; any mistake of
law relates to the operation after that time. It is doubtful whether
the Auto Club analogy would permit retroactive denial of exemp-
tion extending back before the year in which the prohibited
transaction took place, assuming that the "transaction" is not
defined to include the initial organization. If this result is desired,
the Code should be amended to make the intention clear.
Although the Lesavoy decision did not rest on the prohibited
transactions section, since the case involved pre-1950 years, Judge
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7805(b). See, e.g., Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). Cf. Birmingham Business College v. Commis-
sioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960) ("material misrepresentation" in exemption ap-
plication) ; Cooper's Estate v. Commissioner, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,098 (1960),
aff'd per curiam, 291 F.2d 831 (4th Cir. 1961) (retroactive revocation of exemption of
building and loan association).
62 Compare Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956),
with Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc., supra note 30.
63 Supra note 61, at 184.
64 Supra note 62.
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Goodrich added a footnote dictum which may embarrass the Serv-
ice when it attempts a retroactive revocation of exemption based
on that section:
Taken as a whole, § 3813 seems to indicate a Congressional
intent to allow taxpayers to rely on a certificate of exemption
under § 101(6) until revoked prospectively unless the pro-
hibited transaction was entered into for the specific purpose of
diverting the organization's funds, which was not the case here.
Note that even if the subsection (b) puts the taxpayer on clear
notice that he is engaged in a prohibited transaction, and thus
not entitled to exemption, he [a significant slip] is still treated
as exempt until notified by the Secretary.6
These words suggest that it will be argued that Congress has
provided a specific remedy in the case of a prohibited transaction,
and that retroactive revocations of exemption and denials of de-
ductions will be permitted in such cases only when they fit the
terms of the exception in section 503 (a) (2) and (e), despite the
Commissioner's general authority to revoke exemptions retro-
actively under section 501(c) (3). If this reasoning prevails, we
shall have one more example supporting the argument that the
prohibited transactions section has in fact diminished the effective-
ness of the general language in section 501(c) (3).
The limitations of section 503 may be illustrated by a hypo-
thetical example. A taxpayer in the fifty per cent bracket donates
$100,000 to his own foundation in 1958. Since his taxes are reduced
by $50,000, the public contributes half the foundation's funds. In
1962 the foundation lends all its assets $100,000, since the income
has been distributed each year to charity in order to avoid claims
of unreasonable accumulation) to an insolvent business corpora-
tion in which the donor owns less than a fifty per cent interest. In
1964, the exemption is revoked; the loan remains unpaid. The
revocation of exemption is plainly proper, but the only meaningful
sanction would be the retroactive denial of the donor's deductions.
The only argument which might prevail for the government in this
case would be that the donor was a "party" to the prohibited
transaction, although the loan of foundation money was not made
to him but to his corporation. The example in the Regulations
suggests that the donor would not be regarded as a "party."66
65 238 F2d at 593 n. 8.
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.503(e) -1 (1958). These comments must be read with the usual
three-year statute of limitations in mind. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(a). If, how-
ever, the Service can show that the foundation filed a "false or fraudulent return with
the intent to evade tax," there is no limitation period on the collection of the tax due.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(c) (1). The filing of a return on Form 990-A which
did not make disclosure of a prohibited transaction would surely be regarded as a
1964]
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The uncertainty in the Commissioner's power to revoke an
exemption retroactively under the general language of section
501(c)(3) in a case involving a prohibited transaction, coupled
with the fact that prospective denial of exemption is frequently
no sanction at all, suggest that the sanctions of section 503 need
a complete overhaul. As a general rule, the retroactive denial of
exemption and the donor's deduction -should follow whenever the
donor (or a related person, under a new broadened definition of
condemned persons) engages in a prohibited transaction, without
reference to the donor's state of mind at the time of his donation.
Of course there will be cases in which this sanction will be too
extreme; some prohibited transactions will surely be inadvertent,
and retroactive sanctions will be too severe. As an escape valve,
the Commissioner should have the power to withhold the retro-
active sanctions when he determines (i) that the prohibited trans-
action was inadvertent, and (ii) that to deny exemption and de-
ductions retroactively would cause undue hardship. In order to
avoid manipulation of the general three-year limitations period,
a special long period of limitation should be established for cases
of retroactive denial of exemption and deductions under this sec-
tion. Ten years might be an appropriate period, with a no-limita-
tion exception for cases of fraud.
D. Analogous Protections under Section 504. Two of the
provisions of section 504(a) also give some limited protection
against uses of the funds of an exempt foundation which may
endanger its exempt purposes. This section is very limited in its
effect-limited first in that it protects only the income and not
the corpus of the foundation, and limited again in that its sanction
is only a denial of exemption for the taxable year in which im-
proper disposition is made of the foundation's income. Exemption
is denied for the year if the income of a section 501(c) (3) organi-
zation (other than a church, school, etc.) is "used to a substantial
degree for purposes or functions other than those constituting the
basis for exemption . . ." or is "invested in such a manner as to
jeopardize the carrying out of the charitable . . . purpose" of the
organization. Thus, in the example noted above, the foundation's
loan to the donor's corporation would surely jeopardize the founda-
tion's exempt purposes, and would justify the denial of exemption
for the taxable year, but only if the loan had been made out of
fraudulent return. Years prior to the consummation of a prohibited transaction might
be reached (beyond the normal three-year limitation period) on the theory that the
transaction commenced upon the foundation's organization, and that the claim of
exemption was fraudulent from the beginning; such a theory depends upon evidence
of the foundation officials' state of mind.
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the foundation's income; since it was made from corpus, the in-
come having been distributed each year, there would be no sanction
under this section. Since the sanctions of section 504 are even
weaker than those of the prohibited transactions section, and
since most violations of section 504(a) (2)-(3) would also seem
to be violations of the requirements of section 501(c) (3),6 7 there
is little reason to rely on these provisions as protections against
self-dealing by controlling donors.
The resources of a controlled foundation may be used for some
private purposes which are plainly beyond the reach of any fore-
seeable prohibited transactions provision. For that reason, the
strengthening of the prohibited transactions section cannot be
expected to do away with the need for restricting donor control.
Presumably a denial of exemption to donor-controlled foundations
would be even easier to enforce than would a flat prohibition on
all self-dealing, just as the latter prohibition would in turn be easier
to enforce than are the present prohibited transactions provisions.
But a denial of any exemption at all would be still easier to enforce,
and plainly enforcement is not the only relevant concern. The
more persuasive reason for doing away with donor control to the
extent possible is to add one more weapon in the campaign to lessen
the possibility of using the public's charitable funds for private
advantage.
III. DONOR CONTROL
It is clear under present law that donor control over a founda-
tion is not, of itself, enough to cause the loss of exemption. In
Barber v. Edwards the Service denied exemption to a charitable
trust partly because the wife and son of the donor were two of the
trust's three trustees; the government abandoned this argument in
its brief to the District Court, and the court held that control by
the donor did not justify the denial of exemption.69 For a time it
was thought that the Service was going back on its earlier ruling
that donor control was not a fatal defect. 70 But there seems to be
no such concern among the tax bar now.
Proposals for legislative change of this rule range from out-
right abolition of the exemption of family foundations through the
separation of such foundations from ownership of interests in
67 See Randall Foundation v. Riddell, supra note 50.
68 130 F.Supp. 83 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
69 Accord, Saint Germain Foundation, 26 T.C. 648 (1956), acq., 1956-2 Cum.
Bull. 8. See Young, supra note 36.
70 See Young & Galvin, "Proposed Regulations Do Not Clarify Tax Status of
'Exempt Organizations,"' 5 J. Taxation 298, 299 (1956) ; A.B.A. Section of Taxa-
tion, Report 98 (1956).
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controlled business corporations to measures short of abolition
designed to reduce the total degree or impact of donor control,
either by making the creation of family foundations less attractive
or by postponing the donor's deduction until the property he con-
tributes to a controlled foundation is given away to an operating
charity. "Abolition," in this article, refers only to the denial of
exemption and deductions for contributions; it is not asserted that
Congress has the power to abolish family foundations, but it is
within the power of Congress to abolish a class of tax-exempt
organizations.
A. Abolition of Donor Control. There are two basic prob-
lems which must be faced if the Code is to be amended to do away
with donor control of conduit foundations. First, it must be
decided what is meant by "control." Second, the kinds of sanctions,
as well as their timing, must be considered.
The easiest-to-draft definition of control would surely be lim-
ited to voting control. Exemption might be denied if the donor,
along with members of his family, occupied a majority of the seats
on the foundation's governing board. The difficulty with such a
definition is obvious: it fails to take into account that persons other
than members of the donor's family may also be willing to follow
his wishes in dealing with what they may consider to be "his own
moneys." 71 Perhaps some of this probable subservience can be
avoided if exemption is denied when the donor or a member of his
family is a member of the governing board, whether or not they
have voting control. But there is still no assurance that donors will
not dominate the foundations they create from outside the board.72
A definition which includes cases of de facto control would be
preferable, if a workable definition can be constructed.
In the sections of the Code dealing with grantor trusts, 3 an
attempt is made to meet a similar problem. For some purposes,
a power is considered to be held by the grantor of a trust if it is
held by someone who is "related or subordinate" to him; for other
purposes, a power is considered to be held by the grantor if it
71 See note 48, supra.
72 For some colorful examples of informal donor control, see Note, supra note
24, at 491 n.91.
73 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 671-78. Congressman Patman referred to these sec-
tions in recommending the postponement of deductions for contributions to controlled
foundations. See Patman Report (first installment), supra note 2, at 133-34. We are
here concerned only with the definition of control, and not with the other problems
which would be raised by an indiscriminate adoption of all the rules of these sections
for use in the foundation context. See Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, "Comment on the
Patman Report," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 190, 195-99 (1963).
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is held by someone who is a "nonadverse party." The latter
definition will be of no use to us in dealing with the problem of
controlled foundations; ordinarily, the only person with a "sub-
stantial beneficial interest" in the funds and operations of a founda-
tion is the attorney general of the state on behalf of the public.
"Related or subordinate party" is defined as a nonadverse party
who is:
(1) the grantor's spouse if living with the grantor;
(2) any one of the following: The grantor's father, mother,
issue, brother or sister, an employee of the grantor; a corporation
or any employee of a corporation in which the stock holdings of
the grantor are significant from the viewpoint of voting control;
a subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is
an executive. 74
A "related or subordinate party" is presumed to be subservient to
the grantor with respect to the exercise of trust powers unless the
contrary is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In order
to avoid having the grantor treated as the owner of a "Clifford"
trust it is necessary to vest the various powers of disposition of
the corpus and income in "independent" trustees, that is, trustees
none of whom is the grantor and no more than half of whom are
"related or subordinate parties." 75
Estate planners seldom have difficulty in finding "independent"
trustees who are perfectly willing to do what the grantor of a
"Clifford" trust wants them to do. In the foundation context, there
is no reason to believe that the situation would be different. Then
is the answer to be found in a broadened definition of "related or
subordinate parties"? Probably not. It is doubtful whether any
such definition could succeed, in view of the infinite number of
possibilities for finding subservient directors who have no formal
connections with the donor: the donor's banker, his attorney, his
old friend, his neighbor, to name just a few.
The Service formerly recognized a similar distinction in its
tentative exemption policy. Until recently, an organization seek-
ing exemption had to operate actively for a year before a deter-
mination letter would be issued, recognizing the exemption .7  How-
ever, if the organization was "of the community or public type," the
National Office would issue a tentative determination letter with-
74 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 672(c).
75 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 674(c).
76 For expressions of dissatisfaction with this rule, see Rogovin, "Methods and
Objectives of the Revenue Service's Audit Program for Exempt Organizations," in
N.Y.U. Sixth Biennial Conference on Charitable Foundations 229, 236. It was
abandoned in 1963; see note 37, supra.
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out waiting to observe the first year's operation. "Factors which
characterize a community or public organization include respon-
sible public representation on its board of directors or trustees," as
well as support by public contributions and -the requirement of
reporting to a governmental body, such as the attorney general in
states which have adopted general reporting laws, or local boards
which supervise charitable fund-raising.77 The ruling did not spell
out what was meant by "public representation," but presumably
this is a category of directors or trustees who are even more insu-
lated from the domination of a single individual or family than are
the "independent" trustees in the "Clifford" sections. A former
Assistant Commissioner noted that "as a matter of practice, the
Service strictly limit[ed] the application of this policy." 78
An analogous suggestion of a need for public representation
on foundation boards has come from the Congress. In 1954, the
Reece Committee reported:
The suggestion has been made that each foundation should be
required to have, upon its board, or as one of its trustees, a
member selected by a government agency, perhaps the state gov-
ernment. The purpose of the sugestion is that the public would
thus have a direct representative who could watch the operations
of the foundation and take whatever action he might deem neces-
sary if he found a violation of good practice or law. The sug-
gestion may have merit; it may well be worth the consideration
of the Committee on Ways and Means. 79
The committee did not consider the question of "public" trustees
apart from the suggestion of governmental representatives, and
thus did not have to face up ito a definition of the kind we are
seeking. The committee's suggestion apparently has not been con-
sidered seriously by the Committee on Ways and Means.
In any case, the difficulty of defining "public" or "independent"
trustees is a sizable obstacle to any legislative proposal aimed at
abolishing donor control of exempt foundations. One solution
might be to use a word like "subservient," along with an illustrative
definition including, but not limited to, members of the family,
employees, etc., and to leave it to the Service and the courts to
make case-by-case determinations concerning de facto donor con-
trol."0 This is a tempting answer, but one which would make
77 Rev. Rul. 54-164, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 88, 90; Rev. Proc. 62-301, 1962 Cum. Bull.
512, 513.
78 Sugarman, "Current Issues in the Use of Tax-Exempt Organizations," 34
Taxes 795, 799 (1956).
79 H. R. Rep. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 215-16 (1955).
80 Compare the generalized language of Regulations § 1.6033-1(g)(iii), "related
or associated persons," dealing with the exemption from filing information returns
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foundation planning unduly hazardous and the Service's super-
visory task nearly impossible. The best solution out of a generally
unsatisfactory lot would seem to be a voting control rule, based
on a definition similar to that in the "Clifford" sections: a list of
"related" directors and trustees, perhaps including a wider range
of relatives and other presumptively subservient persons."'
The second big problem in abolishing donor control relates to
the choice and the timing of the sanction to be imposed. Should a
controlled foundation's exemption be denied, or should the sanc-
tion be limited to denying the dominating donor his deductions?
Suppose an outsider contributes to such a foundation; should he
be allowed a deduction? Even if the organization is non-exempt?
With a few exceptions (as, in the timing of exemption revocation
and denial of deductions in the case of a prohibited transaction)
exemption and deductions go together, but there is no reason why
this has to be so. No doubt it is far more convenient for the
Service to have the two tied together-either an organization is
exempt or it is not. But the splitting apart of these two incidents
could hardly be attacked as too complex a legislative scheme for
the Internal Revenue Code.
The exemption, not the deduction, was the main source of
the Textron problem. The prohibition on unreasonable accumula-
tions in section 504(a) (1) solves much of that problem; no longer
is it possible to "capitalize the exemption" to build a source of
investment capital for the donor's business. If a conduit founda-
tion's income is paid out regularly to operating charities, and if
the corpus is committed irrevocably to ultimate charitable dispo-
sition, there is no reason for great concern about the foundation's
exemption. It is the charitable-contribution deduction which is
now the principal cause for concern. When a foundation's public
funds are used for private advantage, the main governmental sub-
sidy has already been paid in the form of the revenue lost because
of the income tax (or estate tax) deduction.
Then why not permit a controlled foundation to keep its
exemption, but deny its dominant donor his deductions? The result
in practice would surely be the immediate conversion of a great
many family foundations into "independent" ones, by substitution
of independent trustees for donors and related persons. If, how-
ever, some family foundations were to remain under the control of
their founders, might we not tolerate them? A negative answer is
suggested if there is in existence a substantial number of family
foundations whose donors have already given all they plan to
granted by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6033(a) (3) to charities supported by the public.
81 For such a broadened list, see text at note 55, supra.
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give. For these foundations, the sanction of denial of deductions
would be no sanction at all, unless the law could somehow be
applied retroactively to reach deductions made in previous years.
Such a provision surely would not get through the Congress, and
would probably be unconstitutional if it did.82 Even donors who
planned to make future contributions would likely wait until they
were ready to do so before re-structuring their foundations to give
up control. If the public is to recoup in public-welfare benefits
what it has lost through deductions, then the denial of exemp-
tion for controlled foundations is the only sanction available which
will reach all such foundations.8 3
Any attempt to abolish donor control must rest on the denial
of deductions made by the controlling donor. But it is not enough
to provide simply that deductions will not be allowed to the donor
under those circumstances. Such a provision would not cover the
case in which a donor makes a contribution to a foundation which
he later comes to control. It would not be hard to imagine such
a case: The Jones Foundation, composed of three directors-Mr.
Jones' attorney and his two secretaries-accepts a contribution
from Mr. Jones. Since the foundation is not controlled by him,
Mr. Jones may deduct the amount of his gift. Sometime later,
after the exemption letter is issued, the directors resign, one at a
time; each resigning director is replaced by a member of the Jones
family. Exemption may then be denied, but the major revenue
loss has already taken place. The 1950 House bill, in its provision
relating to deductions for contributions of stock in the donor's con-
trolled corporation, failed to block this obvious path around its
wording.
One way to plug this gap would be to provide for retroactive
denial of a donor's deductions if he should acquire control over the
foundation. Perhaps a special extended statute of limitations should
be provided for such cases, since some donors might be perfectly
willing to make their contributions and then wait for three years
before taking control of their foundations. It might be argued that
such a retroactive deduction denial provision would be unnecessary
if exemption were to be denied retroactively in the case of an
82 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 20 (1915) (dictum).
83 The case of the outsider who makes a contribution to a family foundation is
rare enough that it need not be given great weight in making these decisions.
However, it is not outrageous to suggest as one possible solution that the denial of
exemption to the family foundation need not necessarily result in a disallowance of
the outsider's deduction. He has given up his property; it is beyond his control and
is committed to final charitable disposition; in the meanwhile it may be used for
someone's private advantage, but not his. The problem of defining an "outsider" is
essentially the inverse of that of defining donor control.
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assumption of control. However, the wording of the retroactive
deduction denial provision of the prohibited transactions section
makes possible the inference that deductions are not to be denied
retroactively except in cases expressly noted in the Code.
B. Proposals for Change Short of Abolition of Donor Control.
Because of the difficulty of drafting an effective definition of an
"independent" board, or because of the attitude of influential mem-
bers of the Congress,84 it may be determined that the abolition of
the exemption for donor-controlled foundations should not be
sought. There are, nevertheless, some possibilities short of such
a measure for reducing or keeping in check the total extent and
impact of donor control. The percentage of an estate which might
be given to a family foundation on death might be limited, by
placing a percentage limit on the allowable estate tax deduction.
Or the dollar amount of deductible gifts might be limited for both
estate tax and gift tax deductions."5
More importantly, the birth rate of new family foundations
would surely be diminished if the law were to eliminate the profit
in certain kinds of giving to charity: e.g., the valuation of gifts of
appreciated property at their market value; the giving of income
or annuity interests, valued in accordance with the Treasury's 312
per cent tables. Wholly apart from considerations relating to fam-
ily foundations, the elimination of these "profitable giving" devices
seems justified."6 When a gift to charity costs nothing, or even
profits the giver, it is doubtful that the charitable use of the gift
property will receive the deliberation it deserves. There is a re-
spectable school of thought which holds that charitable giving
should always cost the giver something, not simply for the im-
provement of his soul, but so that he will have to decide on the
usefulness of what he is doing. Whether the presently available
practices amount to an "abuse" of the exemption depends on one's
definitional preferences. Whatever it is called, in such a transaction
84 Supporting an application for exemption of such a foundation on behalf of a
constituent is a fairly inexpensive way for a congressman to do a favor.
81 See Note, "The Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and a Pro-
posal," 59 Yale L. J. 477, 504 n.176 (1950); Latcham, "Private Charitable Founda-
tions: Some Tax and Policy Implications," 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 617, 648-49 (1950).
86 Concerning gifts of non-income-producing property, see Rogovin, supra note
76, at 246-48. Some of the problems noted in the text are not new. See Miller,
"Gifts of Income and Property: What the Horst Case Decides," 5 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1949) ; Griswold, "Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code,"
65 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1951); Bittker, "Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal
Revenue Code: Another View," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1375 (1952). The 1964 act dealt
with one kind of profitable giving, denying a deduction for a gift of a future interest
in intangible property, e.g., a painting. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(f).
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the government pays the taxpayer a bonus for arranging his affairs
to reduce the government's tax revenue. Such a double revenue
loss is justifiable only on the very dubious assumption that the
public benefits more from the charity's use of the contributed prop-
erty than it would from the lost revenue.
Although these "profitable giving" devices do not require
donor control in order to be successful, some estate planners say
that a great many-perhaps most-of the family foundations re-
cently created have been formed to receive gifts of this profitable
variety. Even if the Code were amended to do away with the
profit in giving (for example, by limiting one's charitable-contribu-
tion deduction to his basis for the property given, or allowing a
deduction at market value but recognizing income to the donor in
the amount of the appreciation, or abandoning the rigid use of the
31/2 per cent tables in favor of a more realistic evaluation of a
charity's income or annuity interest), some controlled foundations
would remain. Since the principal unjustified revenue loss arises
from the deduction taken by the donor at -the time of his contribu-
tion, other proposals for reducing the impact of donor control would
defer the deduction in time, or limit it in amount.
A deduction might, for example, be denied to the taxpayer
who contributes to his controlled foundation until such time as
the foundation makes its own gift (of either corpus or income) to
another charity. (We are concerned here with a family foundation
which does not engage in charitable operations of its own, but
rather acts as a conduit for the donor's giving.) Such a principle
would make the revenue loss to the government coincide with the
compensating effective disposition of the property to charitable
operations, but the suggestion is not free from problems:
(i) What should the amount of the deduction be? It might
be the value of the gift made by the controlled foundation to the
operating charitable organization at the time of that gift. This
valuation has the merit of being convenient, but if the property
has appreciated in value in the hands of the foundation there will
be no tax on the increase in value unless the foundation is non-
exempt. Such a principle of valuation might thus permit a donor
to get around any new legislation designed to limit the profit to
be made by giving appreciated property to charity.
To avoid this result, the valuation of the contribution might
be fixed at the value of the property when the donor contributes
it to the foundation. One serious difficulty with this latter proposal
is that the foundation may sell or exchange property or reinvest
its income [within the limitations on accumulation in section
5 04(a) (1)], and it may be impossible to trace any single gift from
[Vol. 25
EXEMPTION OF FOUNDATIONS
the foundation to an operating charity back through such trans-
actions to the donor's original contribution. Furthermore, there
would be some formal inconsistency in denying the deduction at
the time of the initial contribution on the -theory that the donor
has not really given his property away, and at the same time
valuing his gift as of that time for the purposes of allowing a later
deduction. In order to avoid that inconsistency, and at the same
time to prevent the use of a controlled foundation to sidestep any
new rules about gifts of appreciated property, the solution seems
to be (a) to allow the deduction in the year when the foundation
gives the property to an operating charity, and (b) to value the
contribution in the full amount of the property's market value at
that time, but (c) to recognize income to the donor to the extent
of the appreciation of his property during the time when it has
been held by him and by his controlled foundation; the donor
should not be permitted to take advantage of any depreciation in
value while the property is in the hands of the foundation.
(ii) Would this postponed-deduction proposal be inconsist-
ent with the new carry-back and carry-forward rule which permits
a donor to make level contributions to operating charities during
a period of fluctuating income? If the carry-back and carry-forward
rule can be adapted to a legislative package which also denies
exemption (and deductions) when a foundation is controlled by the
donor, then there is no need for postponing the donor's deduction;
the foundation, as a non-exempt organization, will simply take its
charitable deduction when it contributes to other charities. If the
new carry-back rule is not accompanied by legislation denying
exemption to controlled foundations, then the postponement of
the donor's deduction will not cause any serious accounting diffi-
culties. The donor can consider the foundation's gift to an operating
charity to be his own, made at that time; that gift can be carried
forward or back within the prescribed time limits, just the same
as any other gift which he might make to a non-controlled charity.
It will be noted that any proposal to postpone a deduction
until the contributed property is given to a non-controlled charity
will involve the legislative draftsmen in the problem of defining
control, with all the complications noted above.8 7
(iii) How long should the controlled foundation be permitted
to hold contributed property before giving it to an operating char-
ity? Or, to put it more precisely, should there be a limitation
period the running of which will cut off the donor's right to a
deduction even though the foundation passes the property on to
another charity? The answer seems clearly -to be affirmative, both
87 See p. 204 sup ra.
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because it would be intolerable to open up taxable years which are
very far back and also because it is desirable to encourage con-
trolled foundations to make donations of corpus to charities which
will put the funds to work.88 The only remaining issue is the length
of the limitation period; three years seems long enough for this
purpose.
(iv) All of the above discussion has assumed that the con-
text was the income tax deduction; suppose that the deduction in
question is an estate tax deduction? In such a case there is no
question of re-opening an old taxable year, but there is, in the
estate tax case, a difficult matter of probate administration to
consider. If the estate tax is paid without taking a charitable
deduction into account, and then the controlled foundation gives
the contributed property to an operating charity, the resulting
refund will have to be distributed to heirs and legatees, who will
owe more inheritance taxes and whose shares may conceivably be
distorted by the two-step distribution. In the case of the estate
tax deduction, the solution would seem to be to require the con-
trolled foundation to give the property to an operating charity in
time for the deduction to be claimed on the estate tax return;
such a rule would still give a 15-month period after death for the
foundation to select the charities which are to receive the property.89
(v) We have noted the difficulties of tracing property. Sup-
pose that a donor gives property regularly, during his lifetime, to
a controlled foundation; then, on his death, he makes another
bequest to the same foundation. When the foundation makes a
gift to another charity, is the donor entitled to an income tax
deduction for his last taxable year (within the allowable limitation
period), or an estate tax deduction (within the allowable limitation
period)? Presumably he should not get both. One solution might
be to allow the donor's personal representative to choose, but the
more sensible answer seems to be to limit this donor to the estate
tax deduction. There is no reason for picking out the last taxable
year rather than some other year between the time of the donor's
contribution to the family foundation and the time of his death.
The only argument for allowing an income tax deduction (or the
88 There is an additional argument which is weaker: failure to provide for
such a cut-off period may allow a donor to ride the market. This argument is weak,
since riding the market up also would cause the donor to realize income in the
amount of the appreciation, and riding it down would reduce the amount of his
charitable deduction as a compensation for any reduction in the amount of his taxable
gain on the property.
89 There would be no similar gift tax deduction problem, since the gift would
be treated as made only at the time when the controlled foundation passed the
property on to an operating charity.
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opportunity to choose) under these circumstances is that the year
of death is normally not forseeable, and the donor's income tax
rate may be higher than the estate tax rate.
C. Prohibition on Family Foundations Ownership of Inter-
ests in Donor's Business. The revenue bill which passed the House
of Representatives in 1950 included a provision designed to dis-
courage donors from contributing stock in their own businesses to
their own controlled foundations. The bill was not concerned with
the exemption of organizations which already owned such stock
or which might acquire it in the future. Instead it denied a
charitable-contribution deduction, in the words of the Ways and
Means Committee,
for income, estate, and gift tax purposes if both of the following
conditions are present:
(1) The contributor, or members of his family, have voting
control of the organization to which the contribution is made, and
(2) The contribution consists of stock in a corporation in
which the contributor together with members of his family control
50 percent or more of the voting stock or 50 percent or more of
the total stock, counting the stock held by tax-exempt organi-
zations which the family control.90
The committee's motive for recommending this provision was not
made clear in its report:
Frequently families owning or controlling large businesses set
up private trusts or foundations to keep control of the business
in the family after death. This is accomplished by leaving the
business either at death or during life to one of these family trusts
or foundations. Bequests or gifts to such a trust or foundation
are at present allowable deductions for estate, gift, and income
tax purposes. To prevent the avoidance of income, estate, and gift
tax liability in such cases, your committee's bill provides .... 91
It is hard to tell whether the committee's primary concern was
over the loss of revenue or over the use of the foundation device
to assure the retention of control in the family. Evidently the
Senate Finance Committee assumed that it was the latter point
which concerned the House. In eliminating this provision from the
1950 legislation, the Senate committee said:
The House report expressed the view that denial of de-
ductions in such cases would simply be a recognition of the fact
that where such control exists no completed gift for which a
90 H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 Cum.
Bull. 380, 414.
9' Id. at 413-14.
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deduction should be granted has been made. In the opinion of
your committee this overlooks the fact that the donor or his family
must use the property set aside in the foundation or trust for
charitable, etc., purposes rather than for personal purposes.92
The committee added that the loss of revenue in such cases was
outweighed by "the fact that if these deductions are not allowed
still larger funds would be lost to private charity." 93
These rather cryptic remarks by the two committees are not
very illuminating, but they do contain the germs of most of the
ideas which underlie current dissatisfaction with joint foundation-
corporation control arrangements: the revenue loss is not justified
if the property contributed is still controlled by the donor for
private purposes; -the foundation's interest may be used to manipu-
late the corporation for the donor's private interest as opposed to
that of the other shareholders; and the foundation itself may suffer
from its investment in the donor's business.
The latter two objections to common foundation-corporation
control are merely more particularized applications of the above-
developed objections to donor control and self-dealing. (The
phrase "common foundation-corporation control" is used here to
refer to the situation in which a controlled foundation owns stock
in the donor's controlled corporation, and not simply to a case in
which the same person controls both a foundation and a corpora-
tion.) Passing the control of a business from one generation to
another within a family through the use of a controlled foundation
is harmless in some cases. In every case, however, it carries with
it the danger that the management of the corporation will be left in
the wrong hands, perhaps those of the children of the corporation's
founder, just because they are able to vote the foundation's stock.
If the corporation also has other shareholders, such a perpetuation
of management will be an intolerable use of public resources for
purposes of preferring one private group over another.94 And even
if there are not other shareholders involved, the community has an
interest in seeing that dead-hand control does not impose ineffi-
cient management on its enterprises.
When a corporation is run not for -the corporate good of all its
owners but rather for the private benefit of a management clique,
Equity will traditionally supply a remedy. When the Senate Fi-
nance Committee said that a foundation's property must not be
used "for personal purposes," it no doubt had in mind the analo-
92 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 Cum. Bull.
483, 511.
93 Id. at 512.
94 See text at note 19, supra.
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gous doctrine which requires charitable trustees to manage their
trusts for the benefit of the public's beneficial interest in charity;
in this context, the interest of the public resembles that of a cor-
porate shareholder outside the management group. Common
foundation-corporation control thus involves the danger of the
opposite kind of abuse: not manipulation of the corporation through
the foundation, but abuse of the foundation for the benefit of the
corporation.
It may be excessively risky for any charitable organization to
invest a very large proportion of its resources in a single enterprise.
Partly for this reason, but mainly in order to reduce foundation
control over some businesses, the Reece Committee suggested that
it would be proper for the Congress to give consideration to a
scheme which limited tax-exempt foundations to an investment of
a maximum of five or ten percent of their capital in one enterprise. 95
Apart from the investment risk of putting all a foundation's
capital in one basket, there are other reasons why the separation of
foundation and corporation control may help protect the founda-
tion. It may be that a donor who controls both a corporate busi-
ness and a family foundation will find self-dealing more tempting
than will other creators of controlled foundations. Professor Sacks,
arguing for a return to the separation principle of the 1950 House
bill, suggests that a separation of control will go far to meet two
conditions: the avoidance of transactions between related persons
and organizations, and the avoidance of foundation activities which
are especially beneficial to related persons or organizations. He
hints that an improved prohibited transactions provision might
achieve part of these purposes, but adds, "I doubt that these con-
ditions can be satisfied in cases where the donor has given to his
foundation stock control of one or more corporations and proceeds
to manage both." "
Prudent investment policy may dictate that the foundation
sell its stock in the donor's corporation; yet the donor may be
reluctant to give up management control, so that the foundation
will be prevented from selling. Or, good investment management
may dictate an attempt by the foundation, as shareholder, to re-
move the corporation's directors and officers-just as the Kress
Foundation threatened to do several years ago. Yet when those
same directors control the foundation as well as the corporation,
their jobs are probably safe. The foundation may need income
for its exempt purposes; if the corporate management decides not
95 H. R. Rep. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 216-17 (1955).
96 Sacks, "Use and Misuse of the Private Foundation," in N.Y.U. Fifth Biennial
Conference on Charitable Foundations 203, 216 (1961).
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to pay dividends, perhaps in order to take the earnings out later
in the form of capital gains, there is nothing to protect the founda-
tion. All of these are real possibilities, not fanciful imaginings. In
each of the above cases, the complexity of the factors relevant to
decision would make the state's attorney general reluctant to assert
that there has been a violation of fiduciary duty except on the
clearest kind of evidence of wrong-doing. These are likely to be
subtle practices; of course none of them is a prohibited transaction
within section 503, except arguably as an improper "diversion" of
the foundation's income or corpus-and that is a weaker argument
than the Service has yet been willing to try in this area.
So much for the special dangers of common foundation-
corporation control. What technique might be used to prevent it?
The starting place is the House proposal of 1950. That proposal
did not attempt to reach the exemption of the foundation member
of a controlled foundation-corporation combination. Rather it was
limited to the denial of a deduction for a contribution of stock in a
corporation controlled by the donor to his own controlled founda-
tion. There are several reasons why this proposal is inadequate.
The House bill did not impose any sanction on existing donor-
controlled foundations which already owned stock in donor-
controlled corporations. Perhaps it was thought sufficient in 1950
to deal with the future creation of common control arrangements,
but there is no reason now for limiting the attack to the future.
Secondly, the 1950 House bill is limited to a denial of deductions
in the case in which the "common controller" makes the contribu-
tion. If A controls A Corporation and A Foundation, and B-an
unrelated person-contributes some A Corporation stock to the
A Foundation, the 1950 proposal imposes no sanction. This limita-
tion leaves open the possibility of an exchange of stock between two
potential donors, followed by cross-donations to each other's
foundations; the Service might assert in such a case, on a Court
Holding Company theory," that each donor had really given stock
in his own company to his own foundation, but the language of
the proposal was not specific. Even if there is no exchange of stock,
but simply a donation by an outsider, the subsequent common
control is as objectionable as if the "common controller" himself
had made the contribution, with the exception that he has taken
no deduction and caused no loss of revenue.
A further defect of the 1950 House proposal is that it is
unimaginative in its definitions of control; only the contributor,
97 For the Ways and Means Committee's "detailed discussion" of this pro-
vision, see 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 473-74.
98 See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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members of his family, and his controlled trusts and corporations
are regarded as owning stock or holding managerial control on the
contributor's behalf. At a minimum, this category should be broad-
ened to include various other relatives, employees, employees of
controlled businesses, etc., as suggested in the above discussion of
the "Clifford" sections. ° The House bill also failed to consider the
possibility that a contributor might make a contribution of stock
in his controlled company to a foundation which was not at the
time controlled, but then assume control after contributing and
taking his deduction.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the donor might simply
give cash to his controlled foundation, and then have the foundation
buy stock from him. There would be no prohibited transaction
(under the present law) if the price were fair, and there would be
no denial of a deduction at the time of the contribution of cash
under the House bill of 1950. It is no wonder that Professor Sacks
expressed doubt that the language of the House bill was ade-
quate to accomplish the purpose of ending common foundation-
corporation control. 10
Any proposal to end common control over corporations and
exempt foundations must begin with a definition of control. The
above discussions 101 are relevant here with respect to control over
the foundation; as for the corporation, the fifty per cent rule of the
House proposal does not take into account that in many corpora-
tions something less than fifty per cent is sufficient for voting con-
trol. Furthermore, common control is not the only evil which ought
to arouse our concern; as noted above, it may be poor investment
policy to keep a large portion of the foundation's capital tied to one
company. As a consequence, two different types of percentage limi-
tations on foundation ownership interests in a single corporation
may be proposed: a maximum percentage of the corporation's stock,
and a maximum percentage of the foundation's capital.
In 1951, the State of New York adopted a statutory authoriza-
tion for corporations to give to charity
provided that a contribution shall not be authorized hereunder if
at the time of the contribution or immediately thereafter the donee
institution shall own more than ten per centum of the voting stock
of the donor corporation or one of its subsidiaries .... 102
In the province of Ontario, the Charitable Gifts Act, 1959, requires
o9 See text at note 73, supra.
100 Sacks, supra note 96, at 213 n.5.
101 Sections II.B. and III.A., supra.
102 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 34.
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any person who receives an interest in a business for profit in any
capacity for charitable, etc., purposes to dispose of any portion of
the business which represents more than a ten per cent interest in
the business.1 03
The exemption might be denied if a foundation were to hold
more than ten per cent (or five per cent) of a corporation's stock,
calculated either by voting power or by value. Additionally, exemp-
tion might be denied if more than ten per cent (or five per cent)
of the foundation's capital were invested in a donor-controlled
company.0 4 While these two complementary suggestions would not
avoid all common foundation-corporation control, they would cer-
tainly help.
If exemption is to be denied because the foundation owns
too much stock in a given corporation, it may be advisable to
include a provision which gives the foundation a grace period in
which to dispose of its excess holdings. The Ontario statute allows
a period of seven years for this purpose, and gives the courts
permission to extend the grace period as they think proper. A
seven-year period is surely too long in the case of a controlled
foundation which owns stock in a donor-controlled company.
Exemption might be denied if at the end of the taxable year the
controlled foundation owned more than ten per cent of the stock of
a donor-controlled corporation, unless the excess over ten per cent
had been acquired during that same taxable year.
A tightened version of the 1950 House bill would thus add
provisions such as the foregoing relating to the denial of exemption;
broaden the class of persons included in the definitions of control;
deal specifically with the case of indirect contributions through
a non-related party; and provide for retroactive denial of deduc-
tions (and exemption) in the case of an assumption of control over
the foundation after the gift of controlled-corporation stock, and
in the case of the purchase of such stock by the foundation with
cash or other property, contributed by the donor or not.
IV. CONCLUSION
The potentiality for abuse inherent in the tax exemption of
family foundations does not require a general overhaul of our
exemption system; these are narrow problems, in need of par-
ticularized narrow solutions. One political obstacle to the kind of
reform here suggested is that it is so easily confused with a general
103 Ont. Stat. 1959, c. 13, § 2.
104 Such a proposal was made in Note, supra note 85, at 506, and picked up by
the Reece Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1955).
[Vol. 25
EXEMPTION OF FOUNDATIONS
attack on voluntary private philanthropy in general. Let there be
no mistake about it: private philanthropy in general and founda-
tions in particular are worth preserving and promoting.
Foundation funds are pubic funds, however. They are per-
mitted to remain in private hands because important social pur-
poses are served by the decentralization of decision-making and
by the insulation of foundation programs from political and other
pressures which are normally operative within government. When
funds in the public treasury are manipulated for private gain, we
call it graft. There is no reason to invent new euphemisms to
describe similar dealings with public funds which are privately
managed.
The converse of the political dilemma of the reformer is that
abuses by some foundations of their privileged status make all
foundations suspect in the eyes of a public which takes its infor-
mation from congressional press releases. It is the operating founda-
tions-the genuine educational and charitable undertakings-which
stand to lose the most in the predictable backlash from the ex-
posure of self-dealing and other abuses inherent in donor control.
The natural leaders of the campaign to enact these reforms are the
foundations themselves. 10 5
105 See Sacks, supra note 96, at 214. One leader in the foundation world, Dr.
F. Emerson Andrews, has been a consistent advocate of strict self-imposed standards
for foundation management.
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